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SDI AND THE ABM TREATY:
PROBLEMS OF NEGOTIATION
AND INTERPRETATION
by Leon E. Irish
"For 13 years the [ABM] 'freaty has been universally
understood to mean what it says: that any ABM system based in space is out-lawed. Now the claim is that
it means the opposite . ... How can the plain meaning
have been transformed? By an "interpretation" that
ought to embarass the most brazen lawyer in town."
-Anthony Lewis
The New York Times
Oct. 14, 1985
[1 was] astonished by the rather large gap between
what the [ABM] Treaty said and what was attributed to
it."
-Philip Kunsberg
assistant deputy under-secretary of
defense for policy
The Washington Post
11

Oct. 22, 1985

Celebrating the ABM Treaty. On October 3, 1985,
six former Democratic and Republican Secretaries of
Defense-Harold Brown, Oark M. Clifford, Melvin
R. Laird, Robert S. McNamara, Elliot L. Richardson,
and James R. Schlesinger-celebrated the thirteenth
anniversary of the ABM Treaty-the treaty between
the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. 1 The ABM Treaty,
signed in 1972, constitutes one of the two arms limitations agreements produced by the SALT I talks. 2 It
remains the only bilateral arms control treaty in full
force and effect between the two superpowers, and "it
represents a very large measure of what we have to
28

show for four decades of US-USSR an11s control negotiations."3 As part of the celebration, the six former
Secretaries of Defense issued a statement:
[W]e call upon the American and Soviet governments both to avoid actions that would undermine the ABM Treaty and to bring to an end any
prior departures from the terms of the treaty ....
We urge President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev to reach agreement in Geneva to
negotiate new measures which would prevent
further erosion of the treaty and assure its
continued viability. 4
Common understanding of the ABM Treaty. As
commonly understood by leading national defense and
arms control institutions and experts in the United
States, the ABM Treaty generally bans the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and
components, including those based on new technologies or physical principles and those that are seabased, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 5
In other words, while pennitting research, the ABM
Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment
of all existing and future anti-ballistic missile systems
or components, not just those based on 1972 technologies, with an exception pennitting development and
testing at ABM test ranges of fixed land-based systems
and components.
The ABM Treaty and SDI. Thus read and applied,
the ABM Treaty stands as a major obstacle to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program announced by

President Reagan on March 23, 1983. Put the other way
around, the SDI program (sometimes called "Star
Wars") poses a serious threat to the ABM Treaty.
McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S.
McNamara, and Gerard S. Smith recently predicted
that, "The Star Wars Program ... will destroy the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, our most important
arms control agreement." 6

The SDI program would alter the
strategic balance that has governed
superpower relations for the past
40 years.

The president's hope. At the base of SDI lies President Reagan's vision of a new era of strategic weaponry
and defense in which dramatic technological innovations would be harnessed to protect against the threat
of a nuclear holocaust:

What if free people could live secure in the
knowledge that their security did not rest upon
the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy
strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our
own soil or that of our allies? 7
The SDI program would alter the strategic balance
that has governed superpower relations for the past
40 years. Instead of a "balance of terror'' under which
nuclear attacks are deterred by the threat of massive
retaliatory destruction, SDI supposedly would create
a "defense in depth" or a "layered defense" in which
defensive weapons, many of them based in space,
would again be superior to offensive ones.
SDI. Using a combination of startling new technologies, an SDI weapons system would defend against
possible intercontinental ballistic missiles launched by
the Soviet Union by intercepting and destroying them
when they are launched ("boost phase intercept"),
while they are in flight ("midcourse intercept"), and
before they strike their targets ("reentry phase intercept"). The new weapons and components involved in
this exotic new defense system might include X-ray
and chemical infrared lasers, particle beam weapons,
kill assessment sensors, battle management computers, space-based, diffraction-limited mirrors, exoatmospheric homing interceptors, and hypervelocity
electromagnetic railguns, to mention only some of the
possibilities.
SDI debate. Whether these technological innovations are possible, whether they would be sufficiently
reliable, whether they would dangerously disrupt the
stability of the present balance of power, whether vast
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resources should be spent on such programs, and
whether SDI is a concealed attempt by the United
States to use its technological superiority to establish a
first strike capability against the USSR, are all issues
that are being hotly debated. Few political and military
issues have greater importance for the security and
wellbeing of the world. At the heart of the SDI debate,
however, there are also critically important lawyers'
questions of treaty interpretation. For, if the ABM
Treaty, which has unlimited duration, precludes all
aspects of the SDI program except laboratory research,
the other questions become largely moot-unless the
United States is willing to take the politically unpalatable course of withdrawing from the only arms control
agreement it has with the Soviet Union. 8
Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. The day after
the six former Secretaries of Defense celebrated the
13th anniversary of the ABM Treaty and called on the
US and the USSR to "avoid actions that would undermine the ABM Treaty," the Special Arms Control Policy
Group, chaired by then-National Security Advisor
Robert C. Mcfarlane, met behind closed doors in
Washington. At this meeting they adopted a "reinterpretation" of the ABM Treaty that would permit
research, development, and testing of SDI weapons;
only actual deployment would be banned. 9 Two days
later, while appearing on "Meet the Press," Mcfarlane
surprised the world by announcing that testing and
development of ballistic missile defense weapons and
components was "approved and authorized by the
treaty" rather than prohibited. 10
Policy compromise. A storm of protest and controversy erupted. Gerard C. Smith, the chief US negotiator of the ABM Treaty, denounced the new interpretation as erroneous and said it would make "a
dead letter of the ABM Treaty. 11 The very next Friday,
October 11th, President Reagan met privately with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, a strong supporter of the new interpretation, Mcfarlane, Kenneth
Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Secretary of State George Shultz.
After what was described as a "knock down, drag out
meeting," during which Shultz backed his position
with "a subtle threat of resignation," a modified view
emerged: the new interpretation was adopted, but it
would not be applied. In other words, the Reagan
administration intended to operate under the former,
restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, under
which only SDI research was permissible, even though
it adopted the new, broad interpretation as legally
correct and fully justified. 12
Perle's wisdom. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard N. Perle, whose office had originated the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty, subsequently stated
that the decision of the administration to abide by the
restrictive interpretation was temporary. 13 Asked
whether the Soviets would be within their rights to go
ahead with research, testing, and development of
exotic ABM weapons now that President Reagan had
formally adopted the reinterpretation, Perle replied,

"That's correct." 14 In fact, according to the recently
released Arms Control Impact Statement for 1986, the
Reagan administration will resort to the broader interpretation now unless Congress approves the funds that
have been requested for SDl. 15

Mcfarlane surprised the world by
announcing that testing and development of ballistic missile defense
weapons and components was
"approved and authorized by the
treaty" rather than prohibited.

Russian reaction. The ~administration's curious "we
can do it but we won't (for now)" approach did not put
an end to the controversy. On October 19th Marshal
Akhromeyev, the Soviet chief of the general staff and
first deputy minister of defense, published an article in
Pravda, which the Soviet Embassy had translated and
published in The Washington Post. Marshal Akhromeyev
called the US "reinterpretation" of the ABM Treaty
"deliberate deceit:"

Such "interpretations" of the ABM Treaty ....
contradict reality. Article 5 of the treaty absolutely
unambiguously bans the development, testing
and deployment of ABM systems or components
of space or mobile ground basing and, moreover,
regardless of whether these systems are based on
existing or "future" technologies. 16

legal instrument." Rhinelander argued that the reinterpretation leads to an absurd conclusion. In 1972 the
USSR ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability lay
principally in existing technology and its ability to produce and deploy such BMD weapons in large numbers. The US advantage lay in its potential to develop
new BMD weapons based on other physical principles-so-called "exotic systems." It is absurd to think,
argued Rhinelander, that the Russians agreed in 1972
to a perpetual ban on the development, testing, and
deployment of BMD weapons based on current technology while leaving the US free not only to conduct
SDI research but to develop and test BMD weapons
based on such exotic technologies. 17
Questions and problems. The remarkable "reinterpretation" of the ABM Treaty by the Reagan
administration raises many troublesome questions.
Some reasonable conjectures may be made by way
of answering some of these questions. For example,
was this reinterpretation reached and announced unilaterally by the United States instead of being pursued
privately through the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)? This commission was created under the

The remarkable "reinterpretation"
of the ABM Treaty by the Reagan
administration raises many troublesome questions.

Rhinelander said, "If the administration sticks with it as the best
legal interpretation of the treaty,
then the administration has effectively repudiated the ABM Treaty
as a legal instrument."

ABM Treaty to deal with questions of interpretation
and compliance and to consider possible amendments
to the treaty in light of "possible changes in the strategic situation. "18 From what is available publicly, we
know in fact that the Reagan administration has raised
the SDI problem privately with the USSR. 19 The USSR,
however, has continued to level strong public criticism
at the SDI program. For example, First Secretary Gorbachev told the editors of Time that SDI was "the first
stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited under the treaty of 1972."2°From these public
denunciations it is reasonable to conclude that no progress has been made on the issue at the SCC or in the
Geneva arms talks. The administration, or at least key
members of it, apparently decided that it was necessary to have some information on the unilateral US reinterpretation available in the public domain.

ABM Treaty, provided a step-by-step recreation of the
negotiations on the key issue of "exotic systems," arguing strenuously that the Reagan reinterpretation is
wrong: "If the administration sticks with it as the best
legal interpretation of the treaty, then the administration has effectively repudiated the ABM Treaty as a

Why now? Another key question arises from the fact
that no SDI projects will be beyond the research state
until the early 1990s. 21 If no question of violating the
ABM Treaty would arise for half a decade, why was the
question raised and pushed to a presidential decision
in 1985? A plausible explanation presented itself when
Secretary of Defense Weinberger's letter to President
Reagan on arms control was leaked to the press just

Negotiator's reaction. In testimony, first before the
House and then before the Senate, John B. Rhinelander, the legal adviser to the US SALT I delegation
and a principal in the drafting and negotiating of the
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prior to the 1985 Geneva Summit. There had been
strong pressure on the president to agree at the summit meeting that the US would not take SDI beyond the
research phase. In his letter, Secretary Weinberger
urged President Reagan to reject "any agreement to
limit the SDI program according to a narrow and, I believe, wrong interpretation of the ABM Treaty" because
such an interpretation "would diminish significantly
the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our
search for a strategic defense to fruition. "'22 In short,
the Defense Department seems to have pushed hard
now for the j:,roader «reinterpretation" in order to head
off an effort to reaffirm the narrower interpretation at
the Geneva Summit.
How did this happen? Beyond these interesting
political questions, however, and the enormously
important impact that reinterpreting the ABM Treaty
will have on national security and arms control policies, there are basic questions of negotiation and interpretation of agreements that fall squarely within the

Is it possible that a short agreement-only 16 articles and four
printed pages-dealing with such
vitally important subjects, an
agreement that was negotiated for
two and one-half years by leading
diplomats, lawyers, and technical
experts, could be unclear or ambiguous on such a key point?

lawyer's province. Is it possible that a short agreement-only 16 articles and four printed pagesdealing with such vitally important subjects, an agreement that was negotiated for two and one-half years by
leading diplomats, lawyers, and technical experts,
could be unclear or ambiguous on such a key point?
On the other hand, is it really believable that the
United States government would cynically "gut'' a major treaty with the Soviet Union by publicly adopting
an interpretation of it that has no foundation? 23 And, if
the treaty is not clear, how and why did that happen?
Sorting it out. On politically charged and hotly debated issues such as SDI and the ABM Treaty, there will
never be a single view, and perhaps there is no single
"truth." In this case the problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the negotiating history is classified and thus
wholly unavailable in the preparation of this article.
The heart of this question lies in the language of the
treaty itself, however, and that is fully available. 24 Further, in their testimony before Congress, John Rhinelander and Abraham Sofaer, the legal adviser to the
State Department, have provided enough details of the
way the treaty was negotiated and how they analyze it
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to permit a useful discussion of the key questions. In
fact, to understand the core of the disputed issuewhether the Reagan administration's reinterpretation
of the ABM Treaty to allow development and testing of
SDI weapons is legitimate-it is necessary to examine
only a few short provisions of the ABM Treaty.
The text. Article 11(1) of the ABM Treaty provides
that, "For purposes of this treaty an ABM system is a
system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their
elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles ... ; (b) ABM launchers ... ; and (c) ABM radars .... " Article 11(2) makes it
clear that ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and
radars are «components." Article V(l) of the treaty provides that, "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test,
or deploy ABM systems or components which are seabased, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

The only question is whether
the SDI weapons systems that are
being considered constitute "ABM
systems or components" within the
meaning of Article II.

\
\,i-..
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The core question. Although any lawyer would immediately begin to wonder what is encompassed by
such key terms as "system," "develop," "test," and so
forth, these issues have nothing to do with the core
question. It is perfectly clear that Article V(l) bans the
development, testing, and deployment of ''.ABM systems or components" in any sea, air, space, or mobile
land-based mode. We also know that the SDI program
is aimed at producing weapons that can "counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory'' and that every variation of SDI receiving serious
consideration involves placing some "components" in
space. Accordingly, the only question is whether the
SDI weapons systems that are being considered constitute ''.ABM systems or components" within the
meaning of Article II. If so, then the development or
testing of such systems or components is clearly forbidden by Article V(l).
Definitions that would have been clear. If Article
11(1) had said that an ABM system was "any current
system to counter strategic ballistic missiles, etc.," we
would have no doubt that the term did not extend to
BMD weapons based on physical principles or technologies not in use in 1972. If, on the other hand, Article
11(1) had said that an ABM system was any system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles, etc. "whether based
on current or new physical principles or technologies,"
then we would have no doubt that new BMD weapons
based on SDI technologies would be covered.

Ambiguity at the core. Article 11(1) takes neither of
these approaches. Instead, it defines an ABM system
functionally ("a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles, etc.") and then adds the elusive phrase "currently consisting of." Since the functional definition
would by itself embrace new as well as old systems,

[Article II (1)] defines an ABM
system functionally ("a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles,
etc.") and then adds the elusive
phrase ''currently consisting of."

'

'

does the "currently consisting of" phrase limit the
treaty to ABM systems currently in use? Or does it
merely indicate that the parties were aware that technologies were likely to change and that the functional
definition was to extend to new technologies as they
emerged, even though 1972 systems currently consisted only of certain kinds of missile interceptors,
launchers, and radars?
Sofaer's gloss. Judge Sofaer, the legal advisor to the
State Department, argues that Article 11(1) "can more
reasonably be read to mean that the systems contemplated by the treaty are those that serve the functions
described and that currently consist of the listed components. "25 It is clear, however, that there is no "and" in
the text, and to read one in means forcing a meaning
on a text that is not clearly there, at least in the language of the treaty as such.
Negotiator's explanation. John Rhinelander states
that the "currently consisting of" phrase was added at
the insistence of the US negotiators in order to make
clear that reference to ABM systems or components in
the treaty were not limited to traditional technology. 26
Because other easily available language, such as that
mentioned above or the traditional "including'' phrase,
would have made this point clear, while the natural
meaning of the "currently consisting of" phrase does
not, this explanation is not persuasive.
A balanced interpretation. The key phrase-"currently consisting of" -does not clearly limit the application of the main part of the definition, which is
purely functional and broad enough to encompass
either new or traditional technology. Accepting the
ambiguity of the key phrase, considerable weight
would be given to the perpetual nature of the ABM
Treaty and the sweeping nature of its declared purpose
to "achieve ... the cessation of the nuclear arms race
... and general and complete disarmament." As the
Restatement reminds us, an international agreement is
to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of its terms and in light of its object

and purpose. 27 A perpetual treaty intended to end
the arms race could not achieve that purpose unless it
dealt with both new and old technology. Accordingly,
though the question would not be free from dou~t, an
unbiased analysis limited to the text of the treaty itself
would probably favor the restrictive interpretatio~, that
is, the interpretation of the ABM Treaty under which
development and testing of both new and old BMD
weapons that are sea, air, space, or mobile land-based
are prohibited. This, of course, would not explain how
a major treaty could be unclear on such a key point.
Agreed Statement D. The problem, however, does
not stop here. In addition to the text of the treaty itself,
which was signed by Brezhnev and Nixon, there are
seven ''.Agreed Statements" that were agreed upon and
initialed by the heads of the US and USSR delegations
on the same day that the general secretary and the
president signed the treaty. Agreed Statement D provides as follows:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not
to deploy ABM systems and their components
except as provided in Article ill of the treaty,
the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems
based on other physical principles and including
components capable of substituting for ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components
would be subject to discussion in accordance with
Article XITI and agreement in accordance with
Article XIV of the treaty.
Interpreting superfluousness. At first reading this
seems a startlingly superfluous provision. If, by virtue
of the broad, functional definition of "an ABM system"
in Article 11(1), the treaty does embrace all ABM systems, whether based on new or traditional technology,
and since Article V(l) bans the development, testing,
or deployment of ABM systems or components, why
would it be necessary to have an agreed statement that
merely reiterates that ABM systems or components
based on "other physical principles" may not be deployed (unless the parties agree to amendments to the
treaty, as provided in Article XIV)?

Agreed Statement D seems to confirm that the "currently consisting
of" phrase in Article 11(1) restricts
the definiton of ABM systems and
components governed by the treaty
to those based on traditional
technology.
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Giving meaning to Agreed Statement D. On the
other hand, if the parties felt that Agreed Statement D
was necessary in order for it to be clear that ABM systems based on new physical principles could not be
deployed without amendment of the treaty, this would
provide strong indication that the treaty itself does not
extend to new technologies. In other words, Agreed
Statement D seems to confirm that the "currently consisting of' phrase in Article Il(l) restricts the definiton
of ABM systems and components governed by the
treaty to those based on traditional technology. This
would mean that the Article V(l) ban on development,
testing, and deployment of ''.ABM systems or components" does not extend to BMD weapons based on new
technologies, such as SDI. If this were so, then SDI
weapons would be limited only by the Agreed Statement D restriction on the deployment of systems and
components based on other physical principlesdevelopment and testing of SDI weapons, as well
as research, would be entirely permissible.

It is possible, of course, that the
parties had different views .... If
this were the case-and apparently
the classified record provides
grounds for thinking that it was then the most that either party
could be held to under the agreement would be the minimum to
which they had mutually agreed.

The Agreed Statements are more agreements than
statements. Nor can Agreed Statement D be dismissed
on the ground that it is merely interpretative of treaty
provisions and hence its redundancy can be ignored.
By its terms, Agreed Statement D comprises a separate
agreement between the parties. Moreover, though two
of the seven Agreed Statements to the ABM Treaty
seem largely to elaborate on treaty provisions, the others seem clearly to create new substantive agreements
between the parties. 28 It is possible, of course, that the
parties had different views. The US might have regarded Agreed Statement Das merely interpretative,
because it somehow usefully explained treaty provisions that (in the understanding of US negotiators)
dealt with ABM systems based on other physical principles. The Soviets, however, might have regarded
Agreed Statement D as an additional agreement between the parties, for in their view the treaty did not
deal with such new systems. If this were the caseand apparently the classified record provides grounds
for thinking that it was 29 -then the most that either
party could be held to under the agreement would be
the minimum to which they had mutually agreed. 30
34

Here the minimum mutual agreement would seem to
be that ABM systems and components based on other
physical principles could not be deployed without consultation and amendment of the treaty.
The administration's view. This analysis seems to
coincide with that taken by Judge Sofaer and appears
to be the approach that lies at the base of the administration's "reinterpretation" of the treaty. 31 In order to
avoid a conclusion that Agreed Statement Dis entirely
superfluous, the administration reads the Article V(l)
prohibition on development, testing, and deployment
as being limited only to BMD weapons based on 1972
technologies. Under Agreed Statement D, the parties
separately agreed that new technologies such as SDI
would be banned from deployment, but not with respect to development and testing. There is considerable force to this view.
Article V and fixed land-based systems. There are at
least two more turns to the story, however, one relating
to the provisions of the treaty itself and the other a US
negotiator's explanation of how the text came to be as it
is. Article V(l) bans development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components that are sea,
air, space, or mobile land-based. It does not deal with
fixed land-based ABM systems. They are dealt with in
Article III, which deals only with deployment: "Each
Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their
components except that ... " each Party is allowed one
limited ABM system around its capital city and one
around an ICBM silo base. 32

Without Agreed Statement D, the
natural interpretation of the text
would favor the conclusion that the
treaty reaches both new and old
technology.

The treaty summarized. Since the only ABM systems that may be deployed under Article III are limited
fixed land-based systems, since Article V(l) prohibits
development, testing, or deployment of sea, air, space,
or mobile land-based ABM systems, and since the
treaty is silent on research, the net result under the
ABM Treaty is that (1) all ABM research is permitted,
(2) development and testing at ABM test ranges is also
permitted for fixed land-based ABM systems, 33 but
they may not be deployed, and (3) development, testing, and deployment are prohibited for sea, air, space,
and mobile land-based ABM systems. Although not
entirely straightforward, the text of the treaty clearly
says this much. The key question left open by the text
of the treaty is that discussed above: does the definition
of "an ABM system" include new as well as traditional
technology? Again, without Agreed Statement D, the

natural interpretation of the text would favor the conclusion that the treaty reaches both new and old
technology.
Fitting the pieces together. Now, consider again the
language of Agreed Statement D. By its express terms,
it was included only "in order to insure fulfillment of
the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their
components except as provided in Article III of the
treaty .... " Yet, Article III bans deployment of all
'½.BM systems or their components." If the treaty definition of '½.BM system" in Article II extended to new
systems as well as traditional ones, it would be wholly
unnecessary and redundant for Agreed Statement D to
state that ABM systems based on "other physical principles" cannot be deployed unless the parties agree to
amend the treaty to permit such deployment. The matter is made even more confusing because, other than
the precatory reference to Article III in the initial
clause of Agreed Statement D, that statement seems
addressed to ABM systems based on new physical
principles generally, whether fixed land-based (such
systems are the only real subject of Article III; deployment of all other ABM systems is prohibited in Article
V(l)), sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile
land-based. 34

There is no question that the treaty
is at least confusing and ambiguous on the core question of
whether it applies only to traditional ABM systems.

Keeping the exotic fixed land-based option open.
From the account given by a key US negotiator, it appears that the question of "exotic systems" was not part
of the initial negotiations but was inserted by the US
after the drafting had progressed considerably. Soviet
drafts, however, had prohibited "space-based" ABM
systems, as did the US drafts. Although the US government was divided for some time with respect to
"exotic systems," and in fact tabled its first draft on
the subject with the key article omitted, the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff were adamant about preserving the
option to develop and test fixed land-based laser weapons. The US government adopted this position and
advocated a ban on development, testing, and
deployment in all other modes. This view was ultimately accepted by the Russians and explains the
somewhat odd relationship between the texts of Article
III (explicitly prohibiting all but the most limited deployment of land-based ABM systems and implicitly
permitting development and testing as well as research
with respect to fixed land-based systems) and Article
V(l) (explicitly banning development, testing, and

deployment of sea, air, space, and mobile land-based
ABM systems and implicitly permitting all research). 35
Was there agreement that "exotics" were covered?
Although the US position eventually prevailed, John
Rhinelander points out that "the Soviets initially
balked at discussing, let alone agreeing to any limitations on 'exotic systems."' 36 The two delegations
established a working group that proceeded ad
referendum-that is, without instructions but on the
basis that their work product would be taken back to
their delegations and governments for approval or rejection. Although the working group apparently
reached agreement "that current Article V(l) covered
'current' as well as 'exotic' technologies," 37 it was only
later that (i) the phrase "currently consisting of" was
added to Article 11(1) and that (ii) Agreed Statement D
was negotiated by the parties. US negotiators are said
to have sought the addition of the "currently consisting
of" phrase in order "to make clear that references to
ABM systems or components in the treaty were not
limited to 'traditional' technology. " 38 This explanation
is hard to accept, however, for without this phrase the
functional part of the definition would have more
clearly covered new technologies than does present
Article 11(1), and other phrases, such as "including,"
would have had a less restrictive flavor.

The Russians' "exotic" resistance. Paradoxically,
despite the US advantage in new technologies, it was
the US that sought, and the USSR that resisted, a ban
on exotic weapons. Furthermore, both before and after
the working group agreed that the treaty covered new
as well as current technology, the Soviets refused to
accept an "other devices" provision proposed by the
US to the effect that "Each party undertakes not to
deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars
to perform the functions of these components."39 If
the treaty language truly reached new as well as old
technologies, there would have been no need for an
explicit ban on "other [new] devices," and such language would have been superfluous. Moreover, as a
key US negotiator points out, the Soviets balked at tlµs
language for the specific reason that they wanted no
provisions dealing with "exotics," 40 an objection they
would not have had if they had previously agreed that
all new as well as traditional ABM systems were banned. Thus, surprisingly, the conclusion that seems
more clearly substantiated by the sequence of the negotiations is not that the parties agreed that the text
extended to new technologies, but that the Soviets rejected the ad referendum position of the working
group that the new technologies were covered.
The source of Agreed Statement D. Although the
Soviets rejected the "other devices" language proposed
by the US, either for the text of the treaty or as an
Agreed Statement, they proposed language that eventually became Agreed Statement D. It was the US, not
the Soviets, that insisted upon the insertion of the
initial clause that references Agreed Statement D
35

only to Article ill. John Rhinelander's explanation of
Agreed Statement D seems inconsistent. He states
that, although it "refers to, and interprets Article III
only, n the references to other physical principles and
components capable of substituting for traditional
ABM components "are equally applicable to Article
V(l). "41 He agrees that "the language admittedly could
be clearer," but admits that the US never sought an
Agreed Statement confirming that Article V(l) covered
"exotic systems. "42
Drawing conclusions. What conclusions can be
drawn from-this long and rather complicated examination of the ABM Treaty? There is no question that the
treaty is at least confusing and ambiguous on the core
question of whether it applies only to traditional ABM
systems. The text of the treaty, when read in light of its
stated object and purpose and without reference to
Agreed Statement D, would on balance lead to the conclusion that ABM systems based on new technologies
are covered by the treaty.

In short, far from being clearly
wrong, the Reagan administration's reinterpretation of the ABM
Treaty seems in fact to be the more
plausible interpretation, based
upon the whole text and the available, unclassified record.

Once that language is carefully reexamined in light
of Agreed Statement D, however, the balance shifts.
Further, the negotiating history supplied by John
Rhinelander in fact seems more strongly to support the
interpretation he opposes than it does the restrictive
interpretation for which he offers it. Although it is certainly correct to state that Agreed Statement D di?- not
amend the treaty, 43 it is equally clear that a treaty 1s to
be interpreted in light of any agreement relating to it
that is made by the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. 44 On the basis of this principle,
and the established principle that all related parts of an
agreement must be read togethe~ to give meaning a_nd
consistency to the whole, analysis based on the entire
text and the public record militates in favor of a conclusion that the ABM Treaty prohibits deployment but not
research, development, or testing of space-based BMD
weapons based on new physical principles, such as
SDI weapons. 45
In short, far from being clearly wrong, the Reagan
administration's reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty
seems in fact to be the more plausible interpretation, based upon the whole text and the available,
unclassified record. This conclusion, of course, does
not pro~de the answer to more ultimate questions,
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such as whether SDI weapons will work, whether
enormous sums should be spent to create them, and
whether the pursuit of such weapons will enhance or
jeopardize the prospects for peace. Whatever the
answers may be to these larger questions of how best
to seek security in a world of increasingly exotic weapons, however, it is best to begin the analysis with a
clear-eyed and realistic understanding of what the
ABM Treaty does and does not prohibit.
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